

# Does Russia Need a General Staff: The Russian System of Top-Level Military Authority in an International Context

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The open conflict between the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Anatoly Kvashnin, in which both sides decided that they could "air their laundry in public," clearly took everyone by surprise, including President Vladimir Putin, the Russian public, and the military itself. The following is a dramatic description of the situation given in the magazine *Itogi* by the military journalist Alexander Golts, who is not given to sensationalism:

All of Vladimir Putin's initiatives to build the state -- from education in the seven federal districts, to the decisive limiting of the power of governors and the establishment of central federal control over them, to the granting of potent authority to the Security Council -- are based on the fact that ideal for managing a country like Russia is a strictly hierarchical system of command based on strict unity of command and the absolute subordination of the junior person to the senior, as must exist in the Armed Forces.

Naturally it had to happen that in the fervor of creating this vertical line of command these ideal principles were openly and crudely disregarded. The Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Kvashnin, openly ignores his direct superior, Igor Sergeyev. Without informing the head of the military department, Kvashnin sends the president his own plan for reforming the Armed Forces (*Itogi* has written about this plan numerous times). Moreover, he takes this plan to the court of public opinion before discussing it with the Defense Ministry's collegium. Russia is conducting a war, and its top generals are split into two irreconcilable warring camps. The activities of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff are essentially paralyzed.

Most surprising of all is that over the course of several weeks Vladimir Putin and his closest staff, even as they were trying to impose military-style order in the civilian government, have come to accept the blatant violation of military order within the military. Rather than immediately dispatching into retirement the person who violated the chain of command, for the longest time they attempted to present what had happened as some sort of intellectual discussion among military specialists. In the meantime, it is clear to anyone who understands how the Armed Forces work (and the Supreme Commander in Chief and the Secretary of the Security Council as cadre officers of the special services certainly knew this), that regardless of whether the Chief of the General Staff's plan merits approval, he flagrantly violated the principles of military command. And that is far more serious than any draft-version project.

Considering the vertical line of military command a perfect management mechanism, the president and his team proved utterly unprepared for the fact that a bitter conflict could flare up right in the midst of the military. They simply could not believe that generals would sacrifice to their own ambitions both discipline and subordination. Their veneration of the military turned into an inability to straighten out and punish military leaders who had gone too far.<sup>[3]</sup>

Reserve General-Major Aleksey Petrov directly accuses the president of provoking a situation that entailed a virtual diarchy in the military. “Why was Kvashnin’s maneuver possible?” Petrov asks. He answers this question himself:

Primarily because the external conditions had been created. The basic condition that made it possible for the Chief of the General Staff -- who is the Deputy Defense Minister -- no longer to consider himself a subordinate of the Defense Minister was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to allow Kvashnin to report to him personally and to make him a member of the Security Council.

The main problem with this decision is not that Kvashnin immediately displayed ambition, but that one of the most important principles of Armed Forces command was violated – unity of command.

Ideas for partitioning the military department into two parts were tried in Russia in the pre-Revolutionary days, but those ideas had to be abandoned because they lacked substance.

There is nothing worse than a diarchy in the military. Putting the chief on an equal level with an ambitious subordinate destroys the unified-command system and creates highly unfavorable conditions for command activity, causing irreparable harm to the business at hand. The Chief of the General Staff must be subordinate to the Minister of Defense and answerable only to him.

Further, General A. Petrov concludes: “The chances of further mutual, productive service by Sergeyev and Kvashnin are extremely slim.”[\[4\]](#)

As we know, President Putin has removed neither Kvashnin nor Sergeyev, at least not as of late September [2000] when this publication went to press. In my opinion, President Putin made exactly the right decision. The objective possibility, and, essentially, the inevitability of conflict between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff are embedded in the archaic structure of the highest level of military command, which has changed little since the early 20th century and is completely inappropriate for the conditions in today’s Russia. At the beginning of the 20th century the command system moved more or less in step with its analogues in other militarily developed countries. In the intervening 100 years, particularly in the last 50 years, the command system has moved away with increasing speed – and continues to move away -- from the main paths of development of military command systems found in the world’s leading nations.

The early 20th century may be described as the zenith in the development of General Staffs as bodies for operational control of armed forces. By this time nearly all the world’s leading nations had provided themselves with their own General Staffs. Their role grew steadily in the military, politics, and government until WWII.

The German General Staff advanced furthest in this direction. It played a decisive role in operational, organizational and mobilization tasks, as well as in virtually all other tasks that related to preparation for war. The General Staff was completely independent of the Defense Minister and reported directly to the emperor. The Defense Ministry was charged only with administrative tasks and with supplying the current needs of the military. The Defense Ministry essentially executed the directives of the General Staff in matters of materiel supply for the pending war. The Austro-Hungarian General Staff played almost the same role.

In France and England the military command systems were structured somewhat differently. Although their General Staffs enjoyed broad powers in the operational control of the armed forces and in preparing their countries for war, they were nevertheless subordinate to their Defense Ministers, i.e., to people appointed by, and answerable to, Parliament.

The Russian system of military command occupied a middle ground between the German and French systems. The Main Directorate of the General Staff was created in Russia in 1863. In 1865 this directorate

became part of the Main Staff that was subordinate to the Defense Minister. In 1905, after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Nicholas II, attempting to restructure the military command system on the German model, established the position of Chief of the General Staff. Originally the Chief of the General Staff reported directly to the czar and enjoyed equal rights with the Minister of Defense. For this reason the Main Directorate of the General Staff was pulled out of the structure of the Main Staff that reported to the Defense Minister and was made subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff.

However, starting in March 1909 the Chief of the General Staff and his apparatus were again placed under the Defense Minister. Nonetheless, the General Staff's role in military command and control remained dominant. It developed military and mobilization plans, organized troop services, managed railroad shipments, etc. The Main Staff managed personnel training, local military directorates, and governor-generalships.

A distinctive quality of the General Staffs of the beginning of the century, particularly of the German General Staff, was the explicit caste system among the officers. Not only did officers of the General Staff wear a military uniform which distinguished them from the rest of the mass of officers, but having gotten into the General Staff after a careful selection process, they won the opportunity to serve there until retirement. Thus, Moltke, Sr., held Germany's Chief of the General Staff slot for more than 30 years (1858-1888), Schlieffen for 15 years (1891-1906), and Moltke, Jr., for eight years (1906-1914).

The General Staffs reached the zenith of their influence on military policy on the eve of, and during, the First World War. Seeking to outstrip one another in mobilization deployment of troops, it was the hostile sides' General Staffs that virtually forced their governments to launch a war. Even during the years of the war itself their role remained decisive in making the most important military and political decisions. This was particularly notable in Germany where in the final two years of the war the General Staff, in the person of Hindenburg (Chief) and Ludendorff (Senior Quartermaster), practically ran the country.

After the war the victor countries took steps to limit sharply the rights and responsibilities of their General Staffs. The German General Staff was completely dissolved, and the terms of the peace treaty barred Germany from restoring it.

The only exception to the foregoing was Japan, which after the war created its own General Staff based on the German model.

Among the democratic states of the west, the Second World War further discredited the idea of the classic German General Staff. A contributing factor was the decisive role that the Japanese General Staff played in the surprise bombing of Pearl Harbor and of Britain's Asian possessions.

Even the name "General Staff" lost its former popularity and disappeared from the names of the upper-echelon command bodies of the leading Western nations. The USA went with the term "Joint Chiefs of Staff" (JCS), Germany with the "Command Staff of the Bundeswehr," and Great Britain with "Armed Forces Defense Staff." These were not just cosmetic name changes. The functions of these staffs were radically reviewed and their powers reduced. They were also reorganized so that they would be less of a reminder of the General Staffs of the past.

In looking at the missions and structure of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 6 Aug 1958 American law that reorganized the Department of Defense specifically included the following paragraph:

The Joint Staff should not operate or be organized as a unified General Staff of the Armed Forces, and it should not possess executive authority. The Joint Staff may be organized and function like a typical staff body for purposes of supporting the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the latter performs its assigned duties. [\[5\]](#)

The development of the Soviet General Staff went in the opposite direction. True, with the demolition of the old czarist military the General Staff was quickly dissolved. However, measures to create a new General Staff in its place got quickly underway. A large number of czarist General Staff officers were accepted for service in the Red Army. Thus, in the fall of 1918, 518 former General Staff officers were serving in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (WPRA) [RKKA], including 160 generals and 200 colonels and lieutenant colonels. In 1921 the Staff of the WPRA was created, which combined operational, administrative and economic functions. By 1922 this Staff was 12,583 strong. True, the name "General Staff" was not given to this Staff, because the former was not "current." During that period the Bolsheviks were still reluctant to use this name, since the official propaganda of the day viewed the General Staff as an attribute of the imperialistic state. Gradually, however, the term itself was rehabilitated. A book that appeared in the late '20s by WPRA Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov (1928-31 and 1941-42 Chief of the General Staff of the WPRA) played an important role in this rehabilitation. The book was called *The Brain of an Army*, and it looked at the past experience of foreign General Staffs, particularly in Austro-Hungary. The author clearly borrowed the book's title from Spencer Wilkinson's *The Brain of an Army*, which in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was a desktop manual for many English and American officers.

By the time of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet General Staff was appropriate. It had eight directorates: operational; intelligence; organizational; military reports; mobilization; logistics; recruitment; and, military-topographical. It also had three departments: fortified areas; military-historical; and, personnel.

In the war years the functions of the General Staff expanded significantly, particularly in issues of military production. In his memoirs, Marshal Matvey Zakharov (Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense 1960-63 and 1964-71), describes the "General Staff of the pre-war years" as follows:

The General Staff kept close and constant watch on the state of the defense industry. Its activity was not limited to parceling out tasks to the branches of military-weapons production or to monitoring the finished goods as they were received by the army; it also involved such military issues as: developing and designing new combat hardware; maintaining the mobilization readiness, not only of the defense industry, but of all industry in general; creating mobilization stockpiles of materiel and combat assets; the well-planned placement of new factories and their counterparts; production cooperation and much more.[\[6\]](#)

For a long time Marshal Zakharov's book was essentially the only reliable open source of information that revealed to some degree the structure and function of the Soviet General Staff, even if the information was from 60 years ago.

Only two years ago did it become possible to judge the tasks and functions of the contemporary Russian General Staff. This was the result of the 11 November 1998 publication of President Boris Yeltsin's Decree No. 1357, "Issues of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," together with the "General Staff of the Armed Forces Rules and Regulations" (see Appendices 1 and 2).

If one reads the *General Staff Regulations* attentively and compares it with analogous documents defining the tasks and functions of the highest-level military staffs of the world's leading countries, one reaches the inevitable conclusion that the structures described therein have very little in common.

I will attempt to demonstrate this by comparing our General Staff with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff.

First a bit of history. The USA entered the Second World War without a unified defense department or a unified staff of the various armed services (at that time, the Army and the Navy). The Joint Chiefs of Staff was created in 1942 when the chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy met with their British colleagues as a part of the Joint Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of England and the USA, which had been created by Churchill and

Roosevelt. Because the British side of this body was represented by the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff that had been created in the early 1920s, in order to follow protocol Roosevelt decided he would also call the American members of this Joint Committee the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). However, no official documents on the creation of this JCS were published and no legal basis whatsoever was provided for its activity. All of the work of the JCS was carried out exclusively on the basis of Presidential instructions. No permanent staff was created as part of the JCS. All the staff's essential work was performed by officers sent to the JCS on a temporary basis by the various armed services.

The JCS received official legal status in 1947 under the "National Security Law of 1947," under which a unified Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency were also created. The law also sanctioned the creation of a permanent Joint Staff (JS) with an authorized strength of 100 officers as a part of the JCS. Two years later, in 1949, a special Addendum to the "Law of 1947" created the position of Chairman of the JCS, and the number of employees of the JS was increased to 210 personnel. Next, in 1958, as a part of the reorganization of the Department of Defense, JS strength was increased to 400. It remained at this level until 1986 when it grew to 1,627 officers and civilian personnel, pursuant to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This same law created the position of Vice-Chairman of the JCS.

The most important differences between the General Staff and the JCS begin with the fact that the Chief of the General Staff has command power, while the Chairman of the JCS does not. As formulated in Goldwater-Nichols the Chairman of the JCS:

...outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces. However, he does not have the right to military-command functions vis-à-vis the Joint Chiefs of Staff or vis-à-vis any unit of the Armed Forces.[\[7\]](#)

Neither the Chairman of the JCS nor the JCS as a whole exercises operational control of the Armed Forces. In the foreword to the anniversary edition of the journal *Defense*, the twelfth Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell, writes that the JCS "is in no way a General Staff, since it has does not have executive power vis-à-vis the Armed Forces."[\[8\]](#)

In contrast to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Russian Chief of the General Staff does the following, according to the ***General Staff Regulations***:

1. Exercises operational control of the Armed Forces;
2. Carries out according to established procedures the conversion of the Armed Forces to a wartime structure and organization and organizes their employment;
3. Organizes the checking of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, as well as the implementation of the monitoring of the status of mobilization readiness of other troops, military units and organs...[\[9\]](#)

This of course does not mean that the US rejects the importance of the principle of unified command in its Armed Forces. It's just that operational control of troops in the US is exercised very differently than in Russia. The entire top command authority in the US is concentrated in the so-called "National Command Authority," which includes only two people – the President, as Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of Defense. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense shares his right to command with no one. It is no accident that the JCS is the highest staff body of the Department of Defense but not of the Armed Forces. Nor is it by chance that in the legally defined functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs there is no mention of the terms quoted above: "exercises operational control"; "organizes, etc." Instead, phrases such as "assists the Secretary of Defense and the President," "presents for review," "recommends," dominate.

In contrast to the General Staff, the JCS is excluded from the vertical line of operational control: the President → Secretary of Defense → troops. Here, for example, is how things flowed from the Presidential



order to send a Marine Corps battalion to Lebanon in the early 1980s. The Presidential order was received by the Secretary of Defense. From him it passed to the Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR), from him to the Commander in Chief of the Navy in Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), then on to the Commander of the 6th Fleet, then to the Commander of Ground Forces in Lebanon, and from him to the battalion commander.

Nor do the members of the JCS exercise command functions in their second capacity as the chiefs of staff of the respective services. Unlike in Russia the US has no commander in chief of each of the services, and the services are also excluded from the vertical command line: President → Secretary of Defense → troops. The following passage comes from a textbook on the administration of the national security system, as published by the Defense Department's National Defense University (of which the National War College is a part, and based on the rank of its students, is equivalent to the General Staff Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation; naturally there is no JCS academy in the US):

With the exception of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, not one of the uniformed chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces is a commander. The Naval chief of staff has as little relationship to the command of operational forces as the rest of his colleagues. Their authority is limited to making policy, establishing recruitment procedures, training, equipping, supporting and evaluating the operational units of their service. Each service has control bodies under it for carrying out these missions; these bodies monitor their operational units until the latter are “chopped,” i.e., transferred to the operational command of a combatant commander (called a “CINC”). The chain of operational command of troops, the military's holy of holies, completely bypasses the armed services [chiefs] (underlining here and later added by the author –V.S.).[\[10\]](#)

The implementation of the 6 August 1958 Department of Defense Reorganization Act gave direct operational control of troops to the Secretary of Defense. Prior to that time, orders from the Secretary of Defense went through the appropriate departments of the armed services, which were the “executive agents” of the Secretary of Defense. This law put in place the final and nearly indestructible barriers to the emergence of even a pale analogue to the classic General Staff. The law was passed on the initiative of President Eisenhower. On 3 April 1958 Eisenhower asked the Congress to reorganize the Department of Defense in order to adapt it to the “revolution in the technology of war.” He noted the emergence of new types of weapons whose destructive power, range, and speed to target surpassed anything that had been known before. He was convinced that these means of war had not yet made their way into the traditional organizational structures of the armed services. For this reason, the President continued, “We cannot permit the nature of our defense to be determined by the differing views among the services...Allowing administrative confusion and inter-service debates at such a time would be to court disaster.” Eisenhower recommended the following organizational changes:

1. Transform the combat forces into genuine unified operational commands. In the future all operational forces will be transferred to unified commands, and any exceptions will be made only with the approval of the Commander in Chief. Every commander of such a unified command must have indisputable command authority vis-à-vis all the forces subordinate to him, as opposed to the current situation in which some command powers take effect only in an emergency. The troops that are assigned to the unified commands cannot be pulled away from those commands based on orders from the individual service departments.
2. Establish direct lines of command from the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. For this purpose the departments of the armed services must be removed from the direct line of command and in the future not used as executive agents of the Defense Department.
3. In giving the Secretary of Defense the function of direct operational command, the President recommended strengthening the JCS so that they could render to the Secretary of Defense and the Commander in Chief the “professional assistance in strategic planning and operational control of the unified commands.” Specifically, in order to strengthen the role of the Joint Staff (JS) as the staff of the Department of Defense, he recommended removing the 210-officer ceiling that had been set by Congress for the Joint Staff. He also proposed giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the right to vote

in the JCS (previously only the Chiefs of Staff of the services had this right) and the power to appoint, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff director.

While the first two points may not have caused serious objections in Congress, the recommendations on strengthening the JCS, and especially the Joint Staff, raised suspicions in Congress. People suspected that the idea was to turn the Joint Staff into something like a General Staff, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into a Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

Because of this sort of thinking in Congress, a special point was added to the text of the aforementioned law. Its language barred the Joint Staff from “functioning or being organized as a General Staff of the Armed Forces and possessing executive power.” Moreover, in order to prevent the JS officers from becoming a caste of General Staff personnel, their term of service was limited to three years in peacetime. A second tour in the JS was permitted only by express approval from the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, the number of such “old-timer” officers was not to exceed 30. The director of the JS was also limited to three years of service, and he could not be reappointed.

The 1958 law reorganizing the Defense Department added the following item to Section 202 of the National Security Law:

With assistance and counsel from the Joint Chiefs, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, will establish Unified and Specified Combat Commands to carry out military missions and will determine the force structure of such combat commands, drawing upon the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, which will then be transferred to the combatant commands by the corresponding departments for the execution of similar military missions. The combatant commands are answerable to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the execution of military missions that may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense with the permission of the President.[\[11\]](#)

I remind you that the Unified Commands are made up of components from two or more of the services, while the Specified Commands consist predominantly of one of the services. As of 1 September 1992 there were nine Unified Commands: US European Command; US Atlantic Command; US Pacific Command; US Central Command; US Southern Command; US Space Command; US Transportation Command; US Strategic Command; and the US Special Operations Command. At the time, there was also a Specified Command – the so-called Forces Command.[\[12\]](#)

The next important difference between the JCS and the General Staff is their position within the system of their respective Defense Departments. The JCS is the staff of the Department of Defense, while the General Staff is the staff of the Armed Forces. The General Staff’s special role in Russia’s defense organization underscores this fact, since the concept of “Armed Forces” is broader than the concept of “troops of the Department of Defense.” Thus, in the USA the Secretary of Defense -- not the President -- determines the functional responsibilities of the JCS, whereas in Russia the President determines the functions of the General Staff.

The preamble to US Defense Department Directive No. 5100.1 on the functional duties of the JCS (see Appendix 3) expressly states that the JCS is the “immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.” The Regulations on the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff place these two as if on an equal footing within the system of military command. The Defense Ministry Regulations state that the MoD is “the central body of military command and consists of main and central directorates, directorates, and other subunits that comprise its structure.” As we see, the General Staff is not mentioned here. The **General Staff Regulations**, in turn, call the General Staff the “central body of military command” and the “basic body of operational control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;” the Regulations add that the General Staff coordinates other troops, military formations and bodies.

Even a cursory analysis of the functions of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff reveals that the Chief of the General Staff holds much more substantive levers in the system of military command than does the Defense Minister. It is namely the General Staff that is charged with: “ensuring the development of the command system of the Armed Forces” (Part III, Section 6, Paragraph 13); planning and organizing activity for developing the command structure and the country’s communications system, taking defense needs into account; using automated command systems; organizing communication and coordination with other troops, military units and bodies; managing the development of communications systems and automated command systems within the Armed Forces (Para. 14); carrying out reconnaissance activities in the interests of defense and security (Para. 17); developing and carrying out measures related to maintaining information security, command and control, and communications, as well as monitoring their performance (Para. 31), and so forth.

The Defense Ministry’s functions pale in comparison. Pursuant to the Regulations on the MoD, the Defense Ministry primarily either “participates” in something, “coordinates” or “ensures” something, or it “makes recommendations.”

Some functions of the MoD appear to be simply mocking. Thus, the Ministry of Defense is charged with “developing recommendations on the procedures for spending funds allocated to the Ministry of Defense and presenting these recommendations to the government of the Russian Federation” (Part III, Section 7, Para. 8). One would like to see the face of the American Secretary of Defense if he were directed to present recommendations on the procedures for spending funds already allocated to his Department! After all, the entire yearlong procedure of discussing and adopting the American military budget exists in order to spell out very carefully the procedure for spending funds being allocated to the Department of Defense.

Russian and American ideas diverge markedly as to the role of unity of command in the top-echelon military command system. According to the Regulations on the General Staff, the Chief of the General Staff is the First Deputy Minister of Defense. Thus, in accordance with the military’s accepted canons of unity of command he must carry out the Defense Minister’s orders and instructions implicitly. In the conflict with Marshal Sergeyev, more than anything else General Kvashnin’s many detractors blame General Kvashnin namely for violating the principle of unity of command.

Such a situation is impossible in the USA, and not because the role of unity of command is underestimated there. The vertical line of command, i.e., the President → Secretary of Defense → Unified Commands, is adhered to strictly. Unity of command is also very stringently maintained within the Unified, i.e., Combatant Commands.

In the remainder of the US military organization a system of checks and balances, which is inherent throughout the American system of government, is widely employed. Further, it is by design that the service chiefs are not the commanders of their respective services (all the executive power in the various armed services rests with the civilian secretaries, who enjoy broad and legislatively codified autonomy from the Secretary of Defense), and the JCS is pulled out of the national command hierarchy.

The Americans rejected the cult of the unified command, which was so inherent in the Soviet military and now the Russian military, a half-century ago, when they were discussing plans for structuring their Armed Forces after World War II. Many proposals were made at the time, including creating a single Department of Defense, as well as the position of a single Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces who would simultaneously be the chief of staff to the President. During the war the President had such a chief of staff, Admiral Leahy, who held meetings of the JCS and enjoyed equal rights with the other members of the JCS.

However, these proposals failed to win the support of most politicians or of the most influential military people. Navy Secretary G. Forrestal, who would later become the first Secretary of Defense, stated that the proposals to create the position of Commander of the Armed Forces:



...do not take into account the difference between a unified command in a combat arena where urgent decisions are required, and the planning functions at the government level wherein deliberateness and exchange of opinion are needed...Regardless of whether we're talking about business, the government or military operations, I have no faith in the principle of relying on a single genius to make all the responsible decisions. Bad decisions are less likely to be made when the proponent of one side of a plan or proposal is forced to justify it before a group of levelheaded partners. Decisions that influence strategy in a global war must be made by the combined minds of people, each of whom makes his contribution in the form of specialized knowledge, serving at the same time as a check and balance in relation to the others.[\[13\]](#)

Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, speaking in support of creating the JCS as a collective body, stated at Congressional hearings on 18 October 1945, that the future JCS "must possess neither administrative nor operational functions in peacetime. Rather, it must concentrate its efforts on formulating fundamental military policy and creating a balanced security system."[\[14\]](#)

Navy Chief of Staff Admiral E. King, a colleague of Marshall, took the same point of view when he stated that, in his opinion, the power of the JCS must consist of the combined knowledge of its members, as well as checks and balances, which would prevent any one individual from securing dominant positions. As an illustration of what a concentration of power can produce, King cited the experience of Germany, where the excessive concentration of power in the ground-forces-dominated High Command of the Wehrmacht led to the Navy's being forced into secondary positions.[\[15\]](#)

After some hesitation President Truman decided to support the positions of Forrestal, Marshall, King and other opponents of the idea of creating an American replica of the General Staff built on the principle of unity of command.

As Truman noted at the time, he understood that it would be not be possible to maintain in peacetime the same level of coordination of the actions of the independent armed services as the JCS had achieved during the war, when the country was devoting unlimited resources to the war. Given a reduction in funds being allocated, Truman felt that the representatives of the services would fight more aggressively for these funds, a situation that would require more careful tracking of the interests of the conflicting sides.

Truman did not support the proposal to create a single commander of the Armed Forces. In his words, this proposal smacked too much of the "man on horseback" philosophy.[\[16\]](#)

My foray back into history is not an idle one, since at the same time that the US was rejecting the idea of creating a General Staff, the USSR moved -- gradually at first, and later with increasing speed -- towards creating an analog to the German Large General Staff of the 1914 model. Russia moved even faster along this same path, particularly after the beginning of the first Chechen war in 1994.

The basis for this was laid in March of 1953 when the Chief of the General Staff was given the status of First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. This occurred shortly after the death of Stalin, who would probably not have allowed such a turn of events. Extremely original and often bloody, Stalin was a master of the art of "checks and contradictions" in managing the army. It must be noted that his view of the role of the General Staff looks much more modern than do the views of today's General Staff members, who attempt to grab as many functional responsibilities as possible at the expense of the Defense Minister, other power agencies and even the government. As an example, we can cite Stalin's conversation with Marshal B. Shaposhnikov, which Marshal M. Zakharov describes in his memoirs. During one of his reports to Stalin, Shaposhnikov hinted to Stalin that he was overloaded with day-to-day affairs. "After listening to the report," Zakharov writes, "Stalin smiled slightly and then said that the Chief of the General Staff must plan his work in such a way that day-to-day business will take no more than four hours in a 24-hour period. The rest of the time he should lie on the couch and think about the future. Apparently Stalin wanted to emphasize that the General Staff must be constantly engaged in forecasting and thoroughly analyzing the probable trends and prospects in

the course military affairs, looking for the most acceptable ways to build the power of the Soviet Armed Forces.”[\[17\]](#)

In the spring of 2000 and again later with only slight changes and a different title, Russian General Staff Chief Kvashnin and another General, veteran Soviet General Staff member M. Gareev, published a lengthy article entitled the “Seven Lessons from the Great Patriotic War.” It is no accident that in this article, which presents a sort of General Staff manifesto, Kvashnin and Gareev attribute virtually all the miscalculations in preparing for and conducting the past war to Stalin’s underestimation of the General Staff’s role in the system of upper military management:

The view of the General Staff as the basic body for strategic direction of the Armed Forces was incorrect. The words “General Staff” often caused mistrust and were used in a derogatory sense; at one time the need for having such a body at all came into doubt. Those who did see the existence of the General Staff as a possibility thought of it as a technical executive body or a “field office of the main command” that should not have directive rights, rather than as a creative (“the brain of the army”) and organizing body. They said that the directive functions are inherent only in a bourgeois general staff. In a number of instances that was approximately the attitude toward staffs in general. Unfortunately, these attitudes still linger to the present day.

Even after the WPRA staff was transformed into the General Staff in 1935, the formulation of military-technical policy, organizational structure, and recruitment of the Armed Forces, were all removed from its competence. Organizational-mobilization issues were managed by a directorate under the Deputy People’s Commissar [*narkom*], Efim Afanasevich Shchadenko, which resulted in inadequate coordination of measures in the given types of activity and their being resolved by other agencies of the People’s Commissariat [*Narkomat*] in separation from operational-strategic tasks.

The WPRA’s Main Intelligence Directorate [*GRU*] was not subordinate to the chief of the General Staff (the Deputy of the *Narkom* for Defense headed the *GRU*). Rather, it was essentially subordinate to Stalin. It is clear that the General Staff could not fully resolve the question of the strategic use of the Armed Forces without its intelligence body.[\[18\]](#)

The authors offer scathing criticism of the entire upper-echelon military command system that Stalin created:

Not even the question of who would be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in wartime had been thought through. It was originally assumed that the *Narkom* of Defense would fill that role. But from the earliest days of the war, Stalin assumed these functions himself. To this day it remains unclear why protected command-and-control centers had not been prepared for the Main Command, the *Narkomat*, and the General Staff. The organization of the strategic leadership had to be readjusted and improvised on the run as it applied to wartime. All of this could not help but have a negative effect on the command and control of the active army.

The article’s authors do not take this side-trip into history in order to expand our knowledge about the already well-mythologized Great Patriotic War. Rather, they seek to resolve the General Staff’s entirely specific tasks in the further strengthening of the General Staff’s already dominant positions in the entire defense system of the country. The authors make no secret of this:

Today’s General Staff is trying to take these lessons into account and draw for itself the necessary conclusions in the structuring and preparation of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the National Security Concept and new military doctrine that have been affirmed by the elected president of the Russian Federation, V. V. Putin.

In effect all the war's lessons are made to fit with the implementation the General Staff's *idée fixe* – to concentrate in its own hands the entire command and control of the country's defense system. One of the most important obstacles in this path is the independence of the other power structures and agencies. Therefore, the fifth lesson relates to “the unified command of all forces and means.”

During the war, especially in defending large cities, the distinct issue arose as to the need for the coordinated use of all the services (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy) and the military formations of various agencies (the border troops, the NKVD, etc.) and their unified command in carrying out general defense tasks. Unwillingness to submit to these interests, and the desire to act separately, yielded extremely serious consequences. To overcome this disunion, Zhukov and other military leaders had to resort to severe measures. To avoid resorting to such extreme measures in war time [today], decisions made by the RF president call for the General Staff jointly with the leaders of the appropriate agencies to plan and coordinate their harmonized actions, as well as the subordination of all forces and means to the troop commanders of the districts in carrying out joint tasks.

As we see, above the authors hint rather gruffly to the other power agencies that in time of war the “Zhukov's severe measures” may be applied.

As early as after the First World War, Western countries began to strip their General Staffs of the functions of an “organizing body,” turning them into “technical executive bodies,” or “field offices of the main command without directive rights” (here I use the terminology of Generals Kvashnin and Gareev from the aforementioned articles). These countries did so namely because they understood the ruinous consequences that such an “organizing” body with “directive rights” can have for the state and for the outcome of the war. An example here is Germany itself, the creator of the classic imperial General Staff, which the staffs of all the world's leading countries, including the USA, used as a model right up to the war of 1914-1918.

Here is how the well-known military theoretician, Samuel Huntington, describes the role of the German General Staff in his famous work on military professionalism, *The Soldier and the State*:

The First World War witnessed the complete destruction of the imperial balance in military-civil relations. By the end of the war the General Staff was running the German government... War turns generals into heroes. Heroes turn into politicians. The result is that military people lose their professional restraint and caution.

The General Staff's interference in politics began during von Falkenheim's tenure as Chief of the General Staff from the fall of 1914 through August 1916. A slow but continuous expansion of the power and influence of the military took place in this timeframe. However, this was only the prelude to the virtually absolute power that Hindenburg and Ludendorff wielded in the final two years of the war, when the former replaced Falkenheim and the latter became the first Quartermaster General. The fundamental basis for this monstrous expansion of military control was the unprecedented popularity that the victor at Tannenberg (Hindenburg – V.S.) enjoyed with the German populace. He became a national idol, who, the German people fervently believed, would secure victory for them. The intensity of the adoration that came to surround Hindenburg far surpassed anything that any other politician in all of German history had enjoyed, including Moltke and Bismarck. Thus, he proved to be the ideal lever with whose help Ludendorff and the General Staff expanded their influence on the entire government. The mere threat of dismissal was insufficient for control of the Kaiser. By way of demonstrating this weapon, Ludendorff succeeded in forcing the emperor to support the views of the military in most of the conflicts between the General Staff and civilian officials. In the summer of 1917 he managed to have Bethmann-Hollweg removed as chancellor and replaced by Michaelis, whom the military regarded as acceptable from the standpoint of their own interests. Several months later Michaelis himself showed his inability to function in a way that satisfied his military masters. He was removed and on the recommendation of the High Command replaced by Count von Hertling. Subsequently, in January of 1918,

Hindenburg and Ludendorff managed to get the Chief of the Emperor's Civilian Cabinet removed. In just the same way all the remaining military institutions ended up subordinate to will of the General Staff.

The military commanders applied their power in both foreign and domestic policy. In 1918, when the Kaiser refused to grant them control of foreign policy and the peace negotiations, they managed with some success to manipulate the Foreign Ministry via their representative there, von Heften. In July of 1918 they managed to have the Foreign Minister dismissed when he did not support their position on the Brest-Lithuanian peace treaty. Even earlier they had managed to use their influence in foreign policy to impose their will on a whole range of important issues. In the fall of 1916, hoping to increase their military might with Polish divisions, they insisted successfully on the creation of an independent Polish kingdom. This halted the signing of a direct peace accord with Russia. In the winter of 1917, after overcoming Betmann-Hollweg's opposition, they succeeded in winning approval for an unlimited underwater war. Through these two incursions into foreign policy, the High Command managed to cause one enemy (Russia –V.S.) to continue the war, and another (the USA –V.S.) to enter it. Throughout 1917 the High Command insisted on maintaining its annexationist goals, thereby destroying the efforts to achieve peace through negotiations. Military influence was also decisive in economic issues. In the earliest days of the war the activities of the General Staff's economic subsections included supplying the army's needs in food, materiel, workers and weapons. Subsequently not a single area of policy remained outside the interests of the General Staff. Through the so-called Hindenburg Program the General Staff had control of industrial production and assured its growth. All the horizontal limitations on the activities of the military that had been in effect previously were abolished, and the power of the generals penetrated into the furthest reaches of German life.[\[19\]](#)

The results of the activities of the German General Staff can be briefly summed up with the words of the German General von Schönaich who stated in 1924 that: "We owe our downfall to the supremacy of military powers over civil powers. Therein lies the essence of militarism. German militarism actually committed suicide."[\[20\]](#)

By no means am I suggesting that the influence of our General Staff even remotely approaches the all-encompassing influence wielded by the German General Staff during the world-war years. I cite this long Huntington passage to demonstrate that the tendency to expand into all sphere's of a country's life is inherent in the very structure of the General Staff model of the early 20th century.

But the Soviet General Staff that Russia inherited without any changes is just such a structure. In Soviet times to some extent the party restrained this tendency to expand. It kept a watchful eye on the selection of personnel for military leadership and also made sure that the Defense Minister was always higher up in the hierarchy than was the Chief of the General Staff. It was no accident that as a rule the Defense Minister was either a member of the Politburo or was a candidate for membership, while the Chief of the General Staff never rose higher than membership in the Central Committee.

After the collapse of the USSR these restraining factors disappeared and no new ones were created. On the contrary, after the first Chechen war began, the government, in the person of Boris Yeltsin, began to encourage the General Staff's participation in the direct leadership of military actions. Moreover, on 11 January 1995 at a meeting between Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and the Chairmen of the Chambers of the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Shumeyko and Ivan Rybkin, President Yeltsin announced his intention to pull the General Staff completely out of the Defense Ministry and attach it directly to himself. True enough, Yeltsin never implemented his plan, possibly because at that time the General Staff was headed by General Mikhail Kolesnikov, a modest person who respected official subordination, or possibly because he did not find the right person for the job. It is very difficult to judge the motives behind Yeltsin's actions. In any case, this proposal apparently did not win much support in military circles.

General Igor Rodionov, at the time director of the General Staff Academy, spoke out openly against it. He wrote the following in an article entitled “After Chechnya: A New Turn in the Reform of the Armed Forces or a Repeat of Past Mistakes”:

First, the reason for carrying out such a reform needs to be made clear. We are told that in this instance the President will have his own command body that is capable of organizing and planning the country’s defense in an efficient and skilled manner, and of coordinating the efforts of all the power structures that are involved the execution of defense tasks. The assertion is made that in attaching the General Staff directly to himself, the President will be able to neutralize it, and, if necessary, forcibly suppress any external or internal threats to the security of the current political regime...

Any reorganization of headquarters of the Armed Forces inevitably weakens command and control throughout the entire period of the reorganization process. How long will this last? Experience tells us that in Russia reforms do not happen quickly. Can we begin this process in the current complex situation? Will it not result in the ultimate destruction of the state’s military system? Who developed the proposals for such a restructuring of the system of military command and control? Why will even the highest- ranking military leaders and top specialists only learn about the decision from the newspapers?

Second, pulling the General Staff out of the Defense Ministry will immediately cause the creation of a different administrative structure, since not a single ministry, as practice has shown, can get by without them. Will the Defense Ministry in its new form really correspond to its name better than it does now?[\[21\]](#)

Although President Yeltsin did not implement his plan to pull the General Staff out of the Defense Ministry, it is indisputable that the plan strengthened the General Staff’s already great autonomy within the Ministry’s system. In any case, in organizing the drop of assault troops at Pristina’s Slatin Airport, General Kvashnin acted as if he had only one direct superior – President Yeltsin himself. The General Staff’s positions grew even stronger during the second Chechen war. General’s Kvashnin’s receipt of a seat on the Security Council bears tangible witness to this. Thus, for the first time since the Security Council was created, the Chief of the General Staff holds a seat there on the same level as the Minister of Defense.

The media are full of so-far undenied reports to the effect that President Putin approved General Kvashnin’s proposal to pull the Military-Space Forces and the Missile-Space Defense System out of the Strategic Rocket Forces and place them directly under the Chief of the General Staff beginning in 2002. It is asserted that General Kvashnin signed the appropriate directive. If that is so, then it provides yet another confirmation of the rumors circulating in the media about plans to remake the functions between the Defense Ministry and the General Staff in favor of the latter. Thus, M. Kozyrev writes in the weekly *Kommersant-Vlast*:

...the Kremlin is seriously looking at the option of dividing the powers of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, whereby the Minister becomes a sort of supply manager who manages supply and acquisition issues and lobbies for his agency’s interests with the government and Parliament, as well as carrying out representational functions in the international arena. But all the work in military force structuring and troop command and control (both in peace time and in war) will be transferred to the General Staff.[\[22\]](#)

The main purpose for the current issue of the Inter-regional Foundation for Information Technologies Bulletin is to attempt to demonstrate that if such plans actually exist, their implementation will ultimately lead Russia away from the basic paths of global force structuring. The Russian system of top-level military management has been marching in place for an entire half-century. However, in this same period the countries that lead the world militarily have been energetically adapting their defense systems to the changing world situation and the vigorous development of military hardware, and they are moving decisively on, shattering existing stereotypes.



Let us take, for example, Germany's Bundeswehr. It would seem to be a fully flourishing army: Well-fed, well-tended soldiers who don't know the meaning of "*dedovshchina*" [the Russian military's brutal hazing of new recruits –Trans.]; educated officers, nearly all of whom speak English; every regular officer receives a university education at the Bundeswehr's two universities. In late August 2000 I attended a lecture by the Bundeswehr's new Inspector General, Harald Kujat, at the Bundeswehr's top staff academy (successor to the famous German General Staff Academy). I was also a presenter, at the invitation of the President of the Clausewitz Society, General Klaus Nauman. As an aside, the Bundeswehr's Inspector General, like the Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs, has no powers of operational or administrative control over the armed forces, since those powers lie totally and completely with the civilian Secretary of Defense. Like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Great Britain's Chief of the Defense Staff, the Inspector General is himself a military advisor of the Defense Minister.

General Kujat's lecture was about the Bundeswehr reform, which the government has already approved in general terms. He made it clear that what is happening is not really reform at all, but rather the creation of a virtually new Bundeswehr with a fundamentally restructured top-level military command system. Moreover, this fact becomes clear when one studies the official documents of the government and Bundeswehr on reform.

This must be mentioned, because entire generations of our General Staff leaders have rejected almost pathologically any foreign experience in issues of military management. Yet they are also equally intent on comparing the size of military expenditures and the number of nuclear-weapons carriers. Moreover, they are sincerely convinced that our General Staff is essentially no different from the top-level staff bodies of Western countries.

For illustration, let us take the "General Staff" entry in second volume of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*. The entry's author, Marshal Viktor Kulikov (General Staff Chief from 1971-1975) makes the following assertion as though it were a foregone conclusion:

The General Staff is the central command body of the state's armed forces in peacetime and in war...In the USA and England the structure of the highest-level command bodies of the armed forces that had developed by the mid-1970s was basically preserved (as compared to the period of WWII --VS). In the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has as a working body a joint staff, which, based on the tasks it performs, is virtually a General Staff. In the Federal Republic of Germany the functions of the General Staff are carried out by the main staff of the armed forces, which is part of the Defense Ministry (the Russian translation "main staff" is incorrect: the Bundeswehr has a *Führungsstab*, i.e., a Command Staff –V.S.)...General Staffs (or bodies that are *de facto* General Staffs) of the primary capitalist countries exert great influence on the foreign and domestic policy of their states.[\[23\]](#)

The Main Editorial Board for the above volume was chaired by the Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, and the deputy chair was General Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff.

Further, let's take the "JCS" entry from the same encyclopedia (Marshal N. Ogarkov was the chair of the Main Editorial Board):

Based on their powers and functional duties the members are the commanders in chief of the various armed services...Via the JCS the Secretary of Defense exercises operational leadership of the unified and specified commands of the armed forces.[\[24\]](#)

And now, as in Alexander Dumas' *Twenty Years Later*, here is the entry on the "General Staff," no longer in the Soviet encyclopedia, but simply in the Military Encyclopedia, edited by General Pavel Grachev.

...The structure of the top-level command bodies of the armed forces that had developed by the mid-1970s in the USA and England was essentially maintained. In the USA the Joint Chiefs of Staff has a Joint Staff that

is a *de facto* General Staff, based on the tasks it performs. In Germany the main staff of the armed forces, which is part of the defense ministry, carries out the functions of the General Staff.[\[25\]](#)

The author of the entry was Marshal V. Kulikov.

It seems to me that one need not continue on this topic or comment further. I just ask you to believe me (I am not relying on personal experience here) that the secret and top-secret textbooks of the General Staff Academy and the military-technical products of the General Staff say just about the same thing. General Igor Rodionov headed the General Staff Academy for seven years. In his article cited above, which is unquestionably one of the bravest and most interesting of the last decade, even Rodionov expresses his indignation over President Yeltsin's intention to pull the General Staff out of the Defense Ministry: "Why do we avoid our own experience like the plague and want to use only foreign experience?" I want to assure General Rodionov, whom I deeply respect, that this was our own idea, a Russian idea, and from the standpoint of contemporary Western systems of military management it simply looks uncivilized.

I cite these numerous passages in order to explain why I am not ending this article with some specific examples on reforming the Russian system of military control. Given the current level of knowledge, and not just in the military environment, one can hardly count on an understanding or serious discussion of such proposals.

Nevertheless, I do have one proposal. Worth noting, at least in a "narrow military circle," is the 200th anniversary of the birth on 26 October of Helmut Moltke, Sr., the creator of the classic German General Staff School of the 19th century, the school that was subsequently so maimed by his ungifted successors and imitators. After all, it was at the Prussian, and to a lesser degree at the Imperial, General Staff that all the armies of the world studied military command, including the Russian army. And they were not ashamed of this. The misfortune for the Soviet General Staff was that it was built, particularly in the post-Stalin era, not on the Moltke model, but on the model of the imperial general staffs of Austro-Hungary and Germany of the time of the First World War.

Moltke's General Staff was first and foremost a staff of military scholars who were not seeking to seize more and more new functions. At its zenith it never had more than 58 officers, and when Moltke was made Chief of the General Staff (at age 58), it had only 12 officers. It did not have the function of "planning and organizing efforts to safeguard information security and developing measures to protect state secrets in the Armed Forces."[\[26\]](#) It was a staff whose members were not afraid to learn from one another. Moltke himself knew six foreign languages (Danish, Turkish, French, Russian, English and Italian). He translated from English into German Gibbon's 12-volume *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Moltke's own translation of original documents served as the basis for the preparation and publication of a history of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 (in 1836-1839 Moltke served as a military advisor to the Turkish army, and he began his own military service in the Danish army). His General Staff, using a centralized procedure, distributed to the troops abstracts of foreign military newspapers, journals, and the proceedings of foreign Parliamentary discussions on military and political issues. General Staff officers were regularly dispatched abroad to study foreign experience.

As to the title of this issue of the *IFIT Bulletin*, it is hoped that the author's opinion is clear. However, the name of Russia's highest military staff body is not the point. Even today a number of countries (Switzerland, Israel, and a few others) have retained the term "General Staff" in the names of their military control systems, while naturally making them conform to modern staff requirements. Today only two European countries (not counting the CIS) have General Staffs that resemble the Russian model not just in name but also in function – Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, the European Union has already set a requirement for Turkey's entry into the EU: it must make its armed forces conform to European standards (i.e., it must establish complete civilian control of the military, including the General Staff). If Milosevich does not stay in power, Yugoslavia will most likely have to rein in its powerful General Staff.

Thus, Russia would be well served to move swiftly ahead in reforming her system of military control, lest she find herself in the 21st century with a General Staff from the imperial era.

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## **Appendix I**

**Authorized by decree of the President of the Russian Federation on 11 November 1998, No. 1357**

### **Regulations on the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation**

#### **I. General Regulations**

1. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (hereafter the Ministry of Defense) is the federal body of executive power that carries out state policy and exercises state authority in the area of defense, and also coordinates the activities of the federal ministries, other federal bodies of executive power and bodies of executive power of the constituent members of the Russian Federation in defense issues.
2. The Ministry of Defense is the central body of military administration and consists of main and central directorates, directorates and other subsections that make up its structure.
3. The President of the Russian Federation supervises all activity of the Ministry of Defense.

The government of the Russian Federation, pursuant to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation, coordinates the activity of the Ministry of Defense.

4. In its activities, the Ministry of Defense relies upon the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, resolutions and orders of the Government of the Russian Federation, and also this Regulation.
5. The Ministry of Defense is a legal entity and has a budget, seals, stamps and forms bearing its name and the emblem of the State Crest of the Russian Federation, as well as other seals, stamps and blanks, and current, settlement, currency and other accounts in banks and other credit organizations, where all of the foregoing are essential in the performance of its duties, and which accounts are opened pursuant to the laws and other normative legislative documents of the Russian Federation.

#### **II. Primary Tasks of the Ministry of Defense**

6. The primary tasks of the Ministry are:
  - 1) Developing and adopting measures for preparing for the defense of the Russian Federation and the integrity and inviolability of its territory;
  - 2) Organizing and implementing measures to maintain combat and mobilization readiness, and operational, combat and mobilization training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereafter, the Armed Forces) in order to prevent and repel aggression that is directed against the Russian Federation or against the armed defense of the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation, and also in order to carry out tasks pursuant to the international treaties of the Russian Federation;

- 3) Provides the financial means and material and other resources (including services) for the Armed Forces, and, in the established procedure, for the organs of the Russian Federation Federal Border Service troops, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Railroad Troops of the Russian Federation, the troops of the Federal Agency of Governmental Communications and Information under the President of the Russian Federation, the civil defense troops, engineering-technical and road-construction military formations of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the federal bodies of government communication and information, federal bodies of state protection, the federal body for maintaining mobilization preparation, and bodies of state power of the Russian Federation (hereafter called other troops, military formations and bodies), as well as developing and solidifying the material-technical base of the Armed Forces;
- 4) Coordinates the activities of the federal ministries, and other federal bodies of executive power and bodies of executive power of the constituent members of the Russian Federation in the area of defense;
- 5) Participates in implementing military force structuring in the Russian Federation;
- 6) Organizes work with the personnel of the Armed Forces;
- 7) Provides for the social well-being of military personnel, civilian Armed Forces personnel, citizens released from military service and their family members;
- 8) Improves the legal basis for the activities of the Armed Forces;
- 9) Strengthens Armed Forces organizational effectiveness and military discipline and improves the education system for Armed Forces personnel;
- 10) Develops measures to enhance the authority and prestige of military service and to preserve and augment patriotic traditions;
- 11) Participates in international cooperation on military matters.

### **III. The Functions of the Ministry of Defense**

7. The functions of the Ministry of Defense are the following:

- 1) Participates in the development of proposals on formulating the state's military policy and organizing its implementation, and on military doctrine of the Russian Federation; also prepares proposals to the President of the Russian Federation on defense issues for his annual memoranda to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation;
- 2) Manages the development of the Armed Forces' force-structuring concept, coordinates for defense purposes the development of the force-structuring concept and advancement of other troops, military formations and bodies;
- 3) Provides comprehensive support to combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces in order to carry out missions jointly with other troops, military formations and bodies in order to prevent and repel aggression directed against the Russian Federation or against the armed defense of the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation, and also in order to carry out tasks pursuant to the international treaties of the Russian Federation;
- 4) Preserves and improves the mobilization base of the Armed Forces and jointly with other troops, military formations and bodies provides for converting the Armed Forces to a war-time organization and composition and for their strategic deployment and the execution of tasks to repel aggression;
- 5) Controls the status of the Armed Forces, any changes in it, including its resourcing, specific expenditures on military training, its current and future equipping with weapons and hardware, food and clothing for every service member, and the amount of military pay;
- 6) Participates in writing draft versions of long-range state programs and annual work plans in the interests of defense, develops the federal state armaments program and advances the development of the military industrial complex, also makes proposals for the formulation of state defense procurement orders;
- 7) Develops proposals for the defense expenditures called for in the federal budget for the appropriate years and presents them to the Government of the Russian Federation; coordinates and finances work carried out for defense purposes, monitors completion of this work;

- 8) Proposes the procedure for expending funds allocated to the Ministry of Defense and presents these proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation;
- 9) Organizes academic research for defense purposes; orders and finances on a negotiated basis research and experimental-design work in the area of defense;
- 10) Organizes the technical, logistics, medical and financial support of the Armed Forces;
- 11) Organizes and supports within its competence the creation and functioning of efficient, inter-linked (unified, common, or combined) technical, logistics and medical support systems of the Armed Forces and other troops, military formations and bodies, their ordering of weapons and hardware based on an expedient combining and adapting, if necessary, of their powers, taking into consideration the specifics of the structure and composition of the tasks being carried out;
- 12) Orders and finances the manufacture, acquisition and repair of military hardware, the purchase of food, clothing and other property, material and other resources of the Armed Forces, and also, in the established procedure, for other troops, military formations and bodies within the limits of the means allocated for these purposes;
- 13) Coordinates orders to develop and acquire weapons and military hardware of general use for other troops, military formations and bodies in order to unify the weapons and military hardware; also states the tactical-technical requirements for the weapons and hardware models, the basic principles of the scholarly research and military experimental-design products that may be exported;
- 14) Organizes the state ordering of nuclear weapons and state supervision of nuclear and radioactive security in the developing, building, testing, using, storing and recycling of nuclear weapons and military nuclear energy facilities within the bounds of its competence;
- 15) Assures the tracking, storage and expenditure in the Armed Forces of material resources and financial means pursuant to established procedures and norms;
- 16) Organizes in the Armed Forces work on certification, standardization, and metrology; also promotes inventiveness and efficiency;
- 17) Develops and coordinates the conduct in the Russian Federation of unified military-technical policy on the creation and improvement of weapons and military equipment, protecting intellectual property that is created in the process of carrying out state defense procurement;
- 18) Organizes the operation, modernization and repair of weapons and military equipment and property in the Armed Forces;
- 19) Recaptures Armed Forces weapons, military equipment, spare parts and their complementary products, as well as munitions, via state intermediaries for the export/import of military production items;
- 20) Provides intelligence activity in the interests of the defense and security of the Russian Federation;
- 21) Provides for the billeting of troops (forces) and organizes the construction and operation of military infrastructure facilities in the Armed Forces;
- 22) Assures the protection of the state boundaries of the Russian Federation in the air space and in the underwater environment;
- 23) Organizes and supports the execution of military transport actions by railway, maritime, river and air transport of the Armed Forces, and, according to established procedures, of other troops, military formations and bodies.
- 24) Implements, pursuant to federal law, and as a specially empowered body in the area of defense, the following:
  - Total state regulation of the use of the air space of the Russian Federation;
  - State monitoring of the activity of state aviation personnel;
  - Control of flight search-and-rescue actions;
  - Investigation, classification and tracking of air accidents and incidents involving state aviation;
- 25) Organizes the military service of service members and also the work (service) of civilian personnel in the Armed Forces;
- 26) Organizes the functioning and optimization of the training system for military personnel for the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies, and carries out the training, selection, placement and education of Armed Forces personnel;
- 27) Participates in developing state standards for the mandatory preparation of citizens for military service;



- 28) Organizes the moral-psychological welfare of troops (forces) and attends to the military-patriotic formation of service members;
- 29) Conducts work, jointly with the federal ministries, other federal bodies of executive power, bodies of executive power of the constituent members of the Russian Federation and bodies of local self-government, to prepare citizens for military service;
- 30) Finances and supports on a contractual basis all training materials of organizations and large public associations that train citizens in registered military specialties;
- 31) Takes steps for the legal and social protection of military service personnel, civilian Armed Forces personnel, citizens separated from military service and their family members;
- 32) Develops and implements an array of preventive, medical, sanatorium-rest, restorative and rehabilitative activities aimed at protecting and strengthening the health of service personnel, civilian Armed Forces personnel, retirees of the Ministry of Defense and their family members; organizes the activity of the medical, sanatorium-rest and restorative institutions, commercial and food-service activities of the Ministry of Defense;
- 33) Provides ecological support for the Armed Forces in order to preserve and restore the natural environment during every-day activities and combat training of troops (forces), also mitigates the effects of ecologically unfavorable factors on personnel and military infrastructure facilities;
- 34) Implements cooperation with military agencies of foreign states, signs, according to established procedures, agreements with appropriate agencies of the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and other foreign states;
- 35) Participates in implementing military and military-technical cooperation with foreign states and international organizations;
- 36) Participates in negotiations on security problems, reducing (limiting) weapons and armed forces, as well as other military issues;
- 37) Organizes the execution in the Armed Forces and executes within its competence international treaties of the Russian Federation, also participates in monitoring their execution by other states signatory to these treaties;
- 38) Renders assistance according to established procedure to foreign states in the preparation of national military cadres and technical personnel;
- 39) Makes general conclusions on the experience of adopting federal constitutional laws, federal laws and other normative legal documents of the Russian Federation in the area of defense; prepares proposals for improving federal constitutional laws, federal laws, and decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation, directives and orders of the Government of the Russian Federation on defense issues; enters them according to established procedures;
- 40) Organizes work to create and introduces defense-related databases, including legal information; participates in developing and implementing programs of legal informatization;
- 41) Implements the normative and legal regulation of organizing the activities of the Ministry of Defense; organizes legal work in the Armed Forces;
- 42) Sends requisitions to the federal ministries, other federal executive bodies, executive bodies of the constituent members of the Russian Federation and organizations, and receives from them in the established order information and materials essential for resolving issues relating to safeguarding the country's defense;
- 43) Takes measures directed at increasing the authority and prestige of military service, preserving and increasing patriotic traditions; carries out publishing activities and prepares television and radio programs;

The Ministry of Defense also performs other functions as called for by federal constitutional laws, federal laws and other normative legal documents of the Russian Federation.

#### **IV. Ministry of Defense Leadership**

8. The Ministry of Defense is headed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (hereafter, the Minister of Defense) who is appointed to and released from the position by the President of the Russian Federation upon presentation by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

9. The Minister of Defense reports directly to the President of the Russian Federation, and, on issues referred by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal constitutional laws, federal laws and decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, to the Government of the Russian Federation, he also reports to the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

10. The Minister of Defense has first deputies and deputies. The Minister of Defense allocates duties between the first deputies and the deputies of the Minister of Defense.

The First Deputy Minister of Defense enjoys the right to sign orders and directives of the Minister of Defense (except for orders and directives that are subject to state registration).

11. The Minister of Defense:

- 1) Exercises control of the Armed Forces;
- 2) Exercises based on a decree of the President of the Russian Federation, according to established procedure, the conversion of the Armed Forces to a wartime organization and structure and organizes their employment;
- 3) Submits for review of the President of the Russian Federation or the Government of the Russian Federation, according to established procedure, drafts of federal constitutional laws and federal laws on defense issues, and also submits proposals regarding the implementation of state policy in the area of defense;
- 4) Presents to the President of the Russian Federation for approval the concept and plan for the structuring and development of the Armed Forces, the Plan for the Use of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces, the Mobilization Plan, and plans for the efficient equipping of the country's territory for defense purposes, the stationing of the Armed Forces, the location of military facilities, including nuclear facilities, as well as facilities for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear waste, proposals on the structure and composition of the Armed Forces at the brigade level and higher, presents drafts of combined arms manuals, regulations on the Combat Banner of battalion/regiments, on the Naval flag of the Russian Federation, on the procedures for serving in the military, on military councils, military commissariats, and military-transportation duties;
- 5) Submits to the Government of the Russian Federation the federal state program for the efficient equipping of the territory of the Russian Federation for defense purposes, proposals on the amount of material resources that should be accumulated in the state material reserves and their allocation, draft versions of regulations on the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Russian Federation, military record-keeping, the preparation of Russian Federation citizens for military service, the procedure for supporting from local resources the mobilization needs of military units and large units, on military departments at state educational institutions of higher professional learning, on the conduct of military call-ups and on military-medical boards for citizens of the Russian Federation called into military service;
- 6) Organizes defense-related coordination with federal bodies of state power, bodies of state power of the constituent members of the Russian Federation, and bodies of local self-government and with organizations;
- 7) Submits to the Government of the Russian Federation proposals on defense spending as called for in federal budget drafts for the appropriate years, according to the expenditure sequence of the funds set aside for the Ministry of Defense and based on a determination of the conditions of the financial and economic activities of Armed Forces organizations;
- 8) Creates, reshapes and eliminates units that are part of the structure of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (except as stipulated by decrees of the President of the Russian Federation), within the bounds of established authorized strengths and the funds allocated to support said units;
- 9) Creates, reorganizes and eliminates federal state institutions of the Ministry of Defense within the bounds of the resources allocated from the federal budget and the established authorized numerical strength of the Armed Forces;
- 10) Prepares according to established procedures proposals on creating, reorganizing and eliminating federal state enterprises that are part of the Armed Forces, and according to established procedures, approves the regulations of these enterprises (except for Treasury enterprises), determines the procedure for appointing and

removing the directors of said enterprises, approves the signing of, changes in and cancellation of contracts with these directors;

11) Approves the organizational structure and authorized strength of the services and branches of arms of the Armed Forces, of troops that are not part of the services and branches of arms of the Armed Forces, as well as of the main and central directorates, and directorates, within the limits of the established authorized numerical strength of military and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces;

12) Makes decisions on the forming and disbanding of military units and sub-units down to the regimental level inclusively, and also on the stationing and relocating of military units and sub-units down to the regimental level inclusively, within the bounds of the territory given for the use of the Ministry of Defense, and beyond this territory based on coordination with the executive bodies of the constituent members of the Russian Federation or bodies of local self-government;

13) Approves regulations on the main commands of the services of the Armed Forces, on groups of forces and fleets, on bodies of military command and control of the Armed Forces and on units that comprise the structure of the Ministry of Defense;

14) Approves programs of academic research and experimental design projects on weapons and military hardware that are carried out by enterprises and scientific-research organizations of the Ministry of Defense;

15) Accepts into its arsenal (supply, for use), according to established procedures, new and modernized models of weapons, military hardware, and also removes from its arsenal (supply, use) obsolete models;

16) Determines the procedure or writing off weapons and military hardware and other material assets of the Armed Forces;

17) Takes actions to assure the improvement of the quality and reliability of weapons and military equipment;

18) Approves the standards for creating, accumulating and expending troop, operational and strategic weapons reserves, military hardware and other material resources;

19) Presents to the Government of the Russian Federation for approval the standards for supplying clothing and the periods of time for which it will be worn, the standards for foodstuffs; approves temporary standards for supplying clothing and the periods of time for which it will be worn, and also the standards for food items for individual categories of military service personnel who are performing special tasks or living under special climatic conditions;

20) Approves plans for the technical, rear and medical supplying of the Armed Forces, and also for capital improvements in the Armed Forces;

21) Manages work with Armed Forces personnel;

22) Makes recommendations for clarifying military jobs that are to be filled by the highest-ranking officers of the Armed Forces;

23) Resolves issues involved in military personnel performing military service in the Armed Forces and awards them military ranks up to the level of colonel or captain first rank inclusively; approves the regulations on the procedures for awarding Armed Forces service personnel various skill levels;

24) Resolves issues involved in civilian personnel performing military service in the Armed Forces and their carrying out of their work duties; according to established procedures awards skilled ranks to civil servants in the Ministry of Defense; recommends to the government of the Russian Federation authorized strength levels for civilian personnel in the Armed Forces;

25) Resolves issues involved in protecting the rights of military service personnel, civilian Armed Forces personnel, citizens released from military service and the members of their families; resolves issues involved in granting to the foregoing: privileges, guarantees and compensation; presents according to established procedures draft versions of federal laws, decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, and resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation on issues involved in the social protection of military service personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, and citizens released from military service, including their family members;

26) Jointly with the Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, and with the participation of other interested federal ministries and other federal executive bodies, prepares proposals for improving the system of remuneration of military service personnel and of civilian Armed Forces personnel;

- 27) Presents recommendations on creating, reorganizing or eliminating defense-oriented research and experimental-design organizations, professional military educational institutions, military education departments, military departments that are part of state institutions of higher professional learning, on the procedure for preparing citizens in registered military specialties, as well as proposals on establishing benefits for civilians serving in the Armed Forces, depending on the terms of their work;
- 28) Serves as the primary manager of federal budget funds allocated to the Ministry of Defense;
- 29) Determines the procedures for remunerating Armed Forces service members, establishes pay rates according to military jobs and certain categories of military service personnel with reference to pay rates established by the Government of the Russian Federation, and, within the limits of allocated funds, determines supplementary payments to military service members of the Armed Forces;
- 30) Maintains an incentive award fund and manages it according to established procedures;
- 31) Determines the distinguishing insignia of military service personnel according to their service, branch of arms and services, specific military formations, functional designation, personalized insignia items, department insignia for military personnel, as well as the rules for wearing the military uniform, insignia, and departmental insignia;
- 32) Makes recommendations on signing defense-related international agreements of the Russian Federation, concludes and signs such agreements according to established procedures, within the limits of its competence conducts negotiations with representatives of foreign states and international organizations;
- 33) Recommends, according to established procedures, military service personnel and civilian Armed Forces personnel for bestowal of state medals of the Russian Federation;
- 34) Abrogates legal documents of military control bodies and officials of the Armed Forces, where those documents contravene federal constitutional laws, federal laws, official documents of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Defense;
- 35) Organizes the inspecting (checking) of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, and the monitoring of their financial and economic activities;
- 36) Publishes orders, directives, regulations, resolutions, instructions, rules and other normative (legal and normative-legal) documents; when essential, jointly with other federal ministries and other federal bodies of executive power, issues instructions and organizes and verifies their execution;
- 37) Publishes, on defense-related and other issues within its province, normative legal documents, whose execution is mandatory for federal ministries and other executive federal bodies, executive bodies of the constituent members of the Russian Federation, bodies of local self-governance, organizations, officials and citizens;
- 38) Publishes personnel orders that grant the right to register, at no charge (except for state fees stipulated in the registration rules), military service personnel who are serving in the military on a contractual basis, which registration will entitle said personnel to living space at all points where they are stationed;

The Minister of Defense also exercises other authorities pursuant to federal constitutional laws, federal laws, and other normative legal documents of the Russian Federation, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

12. Within the Ministry of Defense a collegium is formed, whose members include as a part of their positions: the Minister of Defense (collegium chairman); the first deputies of the Minister of Defense; the deputies of the Minister of Defense; the commanders in chief of the services; and other officials. Collegium members who are members of the collegium not by virtue of their positions are approved by the President of the Russian Federation upon nomination by the Minister of Defense.

At its meetings the collegium of the Ministry of Defense looks at the most important issues that are within the competence of the Ministry of Defense.

Collegium decisions are approved by the majority of the votes of its members and are published as protocols. If necessary, based on collegium decisions, Minister of Defense orders (directives) may be issued.

In the event of disagreements between the Minister of Defense and the other members of the collegium, the Minister of Defense implements his decision and reports on the disagreements to the President of the Russian Federation. The collegium members have the right to report their opinion to the President of the Russian Federation.

If necessary joint meetings are held between the Ministry of Defense collegium and federal ministries and other federal executive bodies.

Decisions adopted at joint sessions of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense and federal ministries and other federal executive bodies are published as protocols and implemented by joint orders of the Minister of Defense and the chiefs of the appropriate federal ministries and other federal executive bodies.

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## **Appendix II**

**Authorized by decree of the President of the Russian Federation**

**on 11 November 1998, No. 1357**

### **Regulations on the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation**

#### **I. General Regulations**

1. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereafter, the General Staff) is the central body of military control and the primary body for operational control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereafter, the Armed Forces), which coordinates the activities of the organs of the troops of the Federal Border Service, the Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation, the Railroad Troops of the Russian Federation, the troops of the Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information under the President of the Russian Federation, engineering-technical and road-construction military formations of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the organs of the Federal Security Service, the federal bodies of government communication and information, the federal bodies of state protection, the federal body for supporting the mobilization preparation of the organs of state power of the Russian Federation (hereafter, other troops, military formations and bodies) for performing defense-related tasks.

2. The General Staff consists of main directorates, directorates and other structural subunits.

3. The General Staff is guided in its activities by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and by generally accepted principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, resolutions and orders of the government of the Russian Federation, orders and directives of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as this Regulation.

4. The General Staff has seals, angular stamps, blank forms bearing the image of the State crest of the Russian Federation and bearing its name, and other items essential for its work.

#### **II. Primary Tasks of the General Staff**



5. The primary tasks of the General Staff include:

- 1) Carrying out strategic planning on the use of the Armed Forces, other forces, military formations and bodies, taking into account their tasks and the military-administrative division of the country;
- 2) Conducts operational and mobilization training of the Armed Forces, coordinates the operational and mobilization training of other troops, military formations and bodies, and also monitors the status of their mobilization readiness;
- 3) Carries out activities that are related to maintaining the combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces;
- 4) Converts the Armed Forces to the organization and composition of wartime, organizes the strategic and mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies;
- 5) Coordinates the activities involved in keeping military lists, preparing citizens of the Russian Federation for military service and for conscription into military service and military call-ups, and analyzes this activity;
- 6) Organizes intelligence activities for defense and security purposes;
- 7) Plans and organizes communications in the Armed Forces, determines the procedures for using and planning the use of the radio-frequency spectrum for defense purposes;
- 8) Develops measures to organize electronic warfare in the Armed Forces;
- 9) Provides topographical-geodesic support of the Armed Forces;
- 10) Takes actions related to protecting state secrecy in the Armed Forces;
- 11) Organizes troop service and provides for the security of military service in the Armed Forces, monitors their status;
- 12) Conducts military-academic research in the Armed Forces;

### **III. Functions of the General Staff**

6. The functions of the General Staff include:

- 1) Makes recommendations on basic issues concerning the preparation of the nation for defense, on the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the structure, composition, numerical strength, disposition and tasks of the Armed Forces;
- 2) Develops a plan for the structuring of the Armed Forces and coordinates plans for the structuring and developing of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies;
- 3) Coordinates the development of recommendations on the numerical strength of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies;
- 4) With involvement of the federal ministries and other federal executive bodies that have in their structure other troops, military formations and bodies, develops a plan for using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a Mobilization Plan of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Federal Program for the effective equipping of the territory of the Russian Federation for defense purposes;
- 5) Organizes interaction of the Armed Forces with other troops, military formations and bodies in the area of defense, and participates in carrying out tasks in the area of the nation's defense;
- 6) Organizes the conduct of activities that support the combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, monitors their status and the status of the mobilization readiness of other troops, military formations and bodies;
- 7) Organizes the operational support of the Armed Forces, and also the mobilization and strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops, military formations and bodies;
- 8) Approves and manages the authorized strengths and the tables of authorized strengths for the bodies of military control, large units, military units and organizations of the Armed Forces;
- 9) Together with the federal ministries and other federal executive bodies that have other troops, military formations and bodies as a part of their structure, coordinates the authorized strengths and strength tables for these troops, military formations and bodies; jointly with them manages the specified strengths and strength tables;
- 10) Prepares recommendations for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on allocating the established numerical strength of the Armed Forces among the services and branches of arms, as well as among

troops that are not part of the branches of arms of the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Rear Services, organizations and military units for the structuring and quartering of troops;

11) Makes proposals on the number of citizens of the Russian Federation who are called into military service and in military call-ups, also allocates them among the Armed Forces, and other troops, military formations and bodies;

12) Establishes the quantitative norms for conscripting citizens of the Russian Federation into military service, military call-ups and mobilization conscription from constituent members of the Russian Federation, based on the total number of Russian Federation citizens that are subject to the draft. Jointly with the federal ministries and other federal executive bodies, executive bodies of the constituent members of the Russian Federation, bodies of local self-government and organizations for drafting citizens of the Russian Federation into military service in peacetime, plans and organizes the drafting into military-mobilization service citizens of the Russian Federation that are assigned to military units (designated for service in special formations) for performing military service in military jobs as stipulated by the authorized strength levels for war time;

13) Supports the development of the system for command and control of the Armed Forces;

14) Plans and organizes activity for developing the control structures and the country's communications systems, taking into account defense needs; utilizes automated command and control systems, organizes communications and coordination with other troops, military formations and bodies; manages the development of communications systems and automated command and control systems in the Armed Forces;

15) Plans the use of the space assets of the Armed Forces and monitors them;

16) Jointly with the Russian Space Agency develops timetables for the launch of space apparatus for economic and other purposes, as well as for programs of international cooperation;

17) Carries out intelligence activity for purposes of defending and protecting the Russian Federation;

18) Plans and organizes in the Armed Forces information countermeasures against foreign intelligence services, and coordinates their implementation;

19) Manages the operation and mobilization training of the Armed Forces, organizes work to develop and improve the mobilization deployment base of the Armed Forces;

20) Coordinates the operational and mobilization training of other troops, military formations and bodies, maintains records on their composition and strength;

21) Develops a federal state program for the effective equipping of the territory of the Russian Federation for defense purposes and monitors the implementation of this program;

22) Organizes the activity of military commissariats for record keeping and planning the drafting of citizens into military mobilization service, also for deliveries of transport assets to the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies when a mobilization is announced, and also for the creation of a reserve of citizens who have been prepared to serve in registered military specialties;

23) Coordinates the conduct in the Russian Federation of measures for military record keeping, preparing citizens of the Russian Federation for military service and for the conscription into military service and for call-ups, also analyzes this activity;

24) Develops estimated cost justifications for Russian Federation Ministry of Defense proposals on the state acquisition and repair of weapons, military hardware and other material assets; develops the estimated requirements for material assets that are subject to support as a part of the state material reserve for supplying the mobilization needs of the Armed Forces;

25) Determines the Armed Forces' needs for weapons, military hardware, ammunition and other material assets; carries out current and future planning to provide the material assets for the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces, and also accumulates and allocates these resources in peacetime within the limits of federal budget means as allocated for these purposes, and from other sources as stipulated by existing law;

26) Coordinates the writing of draft versions of the primary areas of focus in the development of weapons and military hardware, the federal state weapons program, and the development of military hardware, the state defense procurement orders and the mobilization plan for the economy of the Russian Federation;

27) Makes recommendations on allocating weapons, military hardware, ammunition and other material assets among the services and branches of arms of the Armed Forces, troops that are not part of the services and branches of arms, the Rear Support Services of the Armed Forces, the military districts, and groups of troops and fleets;

- 28) Participates in making recommendations on defense expenditures in the federal budget draft for the appropriate year, in their analysis and justification, and also in the allocating of the resources that are earmarked for defense;
- 29) Plans and implements measures (work) to provide nuclear security, and also to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
- 30) Organizes and coordinates the actions of forces and the use of resources for carrying out territorial defense tasks;
- 31) Develops and takes measures related to providing the security of information, command and control, and communications, and also monitors the implementation of these measures;
- 32) Organizes in the Armed Forces the integrative execution of radio-electronic warfare tasks;
- 33) Plans and organizes measures involved in countering the technical assets of foreign intelligence services and monitors how effectively these measures are implemented;
- 34) Determines the procedure for using and planning the use of the radio-frequency spectrum for defense purposes; assures electro-magnetic compatibility of military assets and international-legal protection;
- 35) Organizes measures related to designing and building facilities of special-designation military infrastructure and to their reconstruction;
- 36) Organizes in the Armed Forces actions to prevent and eliminate emergency situations that are natural or man-made in nature;
- 37) Organizes the topographic-geodesic support of the Armed Forces, and according to established procedures, of other troops, military formations and bodies; develops and organizes measures involving the conduct of cartographic work for defense purposes;
- 38) Plans and organizes work to support information security, develops measures to protect state secrecy in the Armed Forces;
- 39) Organizes encrypted communications in the Armed Forces, manages the encryption service of the Armed Forces and the system for certification of the means for protecting the information of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation according to its security needs;
- 40) Organizes work to protect information from unauthorized access into automated command and control systems of troops (forces) and into information-telecommunications systems in the Armed Forces; also monitors the status of state secrecy;
- 41) Defines the procedures for using actual or agreed-upon [code] names for troop units of the Armed Forces, and also of other troops, military formations and bodies; organizes and manages the list of actual and agreed-upon [code] names of bodies of military command and control, large formations, brigades/divisions, troop units and organizations of the Armed Forces;
- 42) Organizes troop service, monitors its status; organizes and conducts actions to increase military discipline, the security of military service and adherence to regulations in the Armed Forces;
- 43) Manages actions relating to professional psychological selection in the Armed Forces;
- 44) Participates in implementing international cooperation on military issues;
- 45) Coordinates efforts to use the communications network of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the territory of the Russian Federation, and also monitors these efforts;
- 46) Manages the conduct of military-scientific research in the Armed Forces;
- 47) Participates in developing a Civil Defense Plan;
- 48) Develops draft versions of regulations on military record keeping, conscription into military service, preparing citizens for military service, conducting military call-ups, military-medical panels, and also on the inventory of registered military specialties;
- 49) Carries out other functions as stipulated by constitutional laws, federal laws and other normative-legal documents of the Russian Federation.

#### **IV. Leadership of the General Staff**

7. The General Staff is headed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereafter, the Chief of the General Staff).

8. The Chief of the General Staff is subordinate to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, serves as his first deputy and is personally responsible for carrying out tasks assigned to the General Staff.
9. The Chief of the General Staff issues the orders of the Chief of the General Staff and the directives of the General Staff, gives instructions, and organizes and checks their execution.
10. In carrying out decisions of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Chief of the General Staff has the right to give orders on behalf of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.
11. The Chief of the General Staff has first deputies and deputies of the Chief of the General Staff.
12. The Chief of the General Staff:
  - 1) Exercises operational control of the Armed Forces;
  - 2) Implements, according to established procedures, the conversion of the Armed Forces to a war-time organization and structure, and organizes the use of said organization and structure;
  - 3) Organizes the checking of the combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, and also monitors the mobilization readiness status of other troops, military formations and bodies;
  - 4) According to established procedures makes recommendations on the conclusion of defense-related international agreements of the Russian Federation;
  - 5) Approves regulations applicable to units that are part of the structure of the General Staff;
  - 6) Submits for review by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation recommendations on military positions that are subject to being filled by the highest-ranking officers of the Armed Forces;

The Chief of the General Staff also exercises other powers according to federal constitutional laws, federal laws, and other normative-legal documents of the Russian Federation, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

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## **Appendix III**

### **Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Department of Defense**

1. Perform duties as an adviser and a military staff in the chain of operational command vis-à-vis the Combatant Commands, as a channel of communication from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders, and also coordinates communications between the Joint and Specified Commands and other levels on issues of common interest.
2. Develops strategic plans and provides strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, including the managing of operations conducted by the Combatant Commanders, and performs, upon instructions from the Secretary of Defense, any other command functions in relation to these commands.
3. Prepares joint plans for combat-support services and assigns, in accordance with these plans, combat-support duties to the Armed Services and to the Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense; tracks available combat-service resources designated for conducting a general war and for implementing the plans of the Combatant Commanders in emergency circumstances; reviews and makes recommendations to the Secretary of

Defense on questions involving the issuance to the Armed Services of combat-support guidance which, if implemented, would aid in making combat-support services conform to approved strategic plans.

4. Prepares integrated military mobilization plans.
5. Provides appropriate, timely and reliable joint intelligence information for use within the Department of Defense.
6. Checks to see that basic human, material and support requirements conform to strategic and combat-support plans.
7. Reviews the plans and programs of the Combatant Commanders to determine their appropriateness, feasibility and conformity to assigned tasks.
8. Provides military guidance for use by the Departments of the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces and the Agencies of the Department of Defense as they develop the corresponding detailed plans.
9. Participates according to guidance in the development of combined plans of military actions jointly with the armed forces of other countries.
10. Makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the creation and structuring of the Combatant Commands in strategic areas.
11. Determines the needs of the Combatant Commanders in such support areas as infrastructure, personnel and communications, and makes recommendations to the Departments of the Armed Services for providing such support.
12. Develops doctrine for conducting joint operations and combat training, and also coordinates the [joint] military education of military service members.
13. Makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the latter's assigning of basic responsibility for the performance by the Armed Forces of any function, where such a decision is required, and also in regard to the transfer, giving again, abolishing or consolidating such functions.
14. In connection with working out a budget, prepares and presents to the Secretary of Defense for his information and review considerations relating to military requirements that are based on assessments of the strategic situation of the USA and current national security policy, and on strategic plans for war. These ideas regarding requirements must include the tasks, task priorities, force requirements, and also general strategic guidance on developing a network of military facilities and bases and on equipping and supporting military forces.
15. Makes recommendations and gives assistance to the Secretary of Defense on issues of research and engineering, by doing the following: formulates broad strategic guidance for use in the process of preparing an integrated program for the Department of Defense; assesses general military requirements; assesses the relative military importance of research and development projects for the needs of the Combatant Commands; recommends the delivery to the Armed Forces of specific new weapons.
16. Prepares and presents to the Secretary of Defense for his information and review general strategic guidance on developing programs of industrial mobilization.



17. Prepares and presents to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in assembling programs of military assistance and other actions relating to foreign military forces, including recommendations on correlating the allied requirements in military force with the strategic goals of the USA, and also for implementation of approved programs; as needed, makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on supporting the Military Assistance Program in accordance with approved strategic concepts.
18. Provides US representation in the Military Committee of the US Mission to the United Nations pursuant to the UN Charter, as well as representation on other duly sanctioned military staffs, committees, councils and missions.
19. Performs other duties that may be assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense.[\[27\]](#)
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## Endnotes

- [\[1\]](#) MFIT members are: The Administrations of the of Leningrad region, Vladimir region, the Krasnoyarsk territory, the Murmansk region, the Novosibirsk region, the Perm region, Primorsk region, the Republic of Karelia, the Chuvash Republic, and the Editorial Board of the Almanac *Pamyatniki Otechestva*[Monuments of the Fatherland].
- [\[2\]](#) Vitaly Vasilevich Shlykov is a specialist with the Inter-Regional Foundation for Information Technologies, a member of the Council on Foreign Defense Policy, and past Chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Defense Issues.
- [\[3\]](#) *Itogi*, No. 33 (219), 16 August 2000.
- [\[4\]](#) *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 June 2000.
- [\[5\]](#) *The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958*, Public Law 85-599, 6 August 1958.
- [\[6\]](#) M. V. Zakharov, *General'nyy shtab v predvoyennyye gody*, Moscow, 1989, p. 290.
- [\[7\]](#) Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-433, 1 October 1986, para. 152 (C).
- [\[8\]](#) *Defense*, 1992 Special Issue, p.2.
- [\[9\]](#) *Polozheniye o General'nom shtabe Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, ch. IV, razd. 12.
- [\[10\]](#) *National Security Policy Formulation: Institutions, Processes and Issues*, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 75.
- [\[11\]](#) *The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958*, Public Law 85-599, 6 August 1958.
- [\[12\]](#) *Defense*, September/October 1992.
- [\[13\]](#) *Role and Function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, a Chronology, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., January 1987, pp. 23-24
- [\[14\]](#) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[15] Ibid., p. 15.

[16] *Role and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 21.

[17] Zakharov, *General'nyy shtab v predvoyennyye gody*, 124.

[18] *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, No. 15 (18), 28 April 2000; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 May 2000.

[19] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard, 1985), pp. 106-107.

[20] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 108.

[21] *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 9 February 1995.

[22] *Kommersant-Vlast'*, No. 33 (384), 18 August 2000, p. 14.

[23] *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), 2:511.

[24] Ibid., 1977, 4:266.

[25] *Voyennaya entsiklopediya*, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1994), 2: 380.

[26] *Polozheniye o Genshtabe VS RF*, part III, section 6, paragraph 38.

[27] DoD Directive No. 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," 10 January 1986.